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Japanese Competition in the Trade of Malaya
in the 1930s
Denis KOH Soo Jin* and TANAKA Kyoko**
This essay demonstrates how politics,
rather than economic rationality, domi-
nated the Japanese trade in British Malaya
(today's West Malaysia and Singapore)
during the 1930s. Unlike earlier works
such as L.A. Mills' British Rule in Eastern
Asia and Yuen Choy Leng's M.A. thesis
Expansion ofJapanese Interests in Malaya,
1900-1941 which briefly touch on the
subject, the study focuses specifically on
the nature of Japanese competition, the
reasons for its rise and decline and
Malayan domestic responses to the trade
encroachment. It concentrates on com-
petition posed by Japanese mercantile
interests in Malaya and by direct Japanese
imports. The present essay tends to place
more emphasis on Singapore than the rest
of l\1alaya, since the city was the trading
... Ministry of Defence, Republic of Singapore,
Holland Road, Singapore 1025
...... E81fl~.:r, Institute of International Studies,
Chubu Institute of Technology, Kasugai,
Aichi-ken 487, Japan
1) The Malayan market took no more than
three percent of the total Japanese exports
in the 1930s. For the relative importance of
the Southeast Asian markets for Japan's
exports particularly cotton goods, see
Murayama Yoshitada, "Ryi5taisen-kan-ki
Nihon Men-orimQno no T~nan Ajia Shin-
shutsu--Ranry~ Indo 0 Choshin ni,"
Tonan Ajia: Rekishi to Bunka 11 (June 1982),
pp. 37-50 passim.
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centre of the area.
Although relatively insignificant among
the destinations of Japanese exports,l) the
prewar Malayan market is of special
interest for two reasons. First, Japan's
export performance almost directly re-
flected its competitive power, for the
British colonial authorities more or less
adhered to the free trade principle.
Second, Japanese competItIOn ended
abruptly in late 1937 chiefly because of
politics of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Japanese competition in invisible items
(i.e., services such as banking, insurance,
shipping, etc.) is not dealt with because
of its relative unimportance and the
difficulties in gauging such competition.
Among those in Malaya affected by
Japanese competition, more attention is
given to merchants represented by the
Singapore Chamber of Commerce. These
were mostly English, European and
English-speaking locals, rather than petty
Chinese dealers. The former were the
principal groups affected because they
handled western imports which became
less popular than low priced Japanese
alternatives. The petty Chinese dealers,
mostly wholesalers and retailers, remained
relatively unaffected SInce they could
switch to more competitive sources of
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Source: Malaya Return ofForeign Imports and Ex-
ports [25]
Table 2 Gross Value ofBritish Malayan Imports
[rom Japan, 1921-1929 (Including Bul-
lion and Coin) (in Straits Dollars)
1921 22,614,702 502,066,252 4.5
1923 18,143,469 593,414,252 3.1
1925 29,956,972 1,008,052,246 3.0
1927 30,215,208 1,017,812,454 3.0
1929 23,189,934 898,568,070 2.6
---~----- - .--- "-,--_._._._-------_ ..... --------_..-
"a standing exhibition of Japanese goods
for which orders could be placed and
connections arranged through museum
staff" [1, I, 11: 59; 2, 26 Nov. 1918J.
During the 1910s and 1920s, the
British took no measure to check the
growth of Japan's share of the market.
Besides their unwillingness to depart from
the principle of free trade, political
expediency made the British reluctant to
displease the Japanese, as the security of
their Asian colonies relied heavily on
Japan's goodwill [3: 88J. Japanese com-
petition was modest in the 1920s, although
it was beginning to make an impact. By
1930, Japan had well established itself in
certain products such as artificial silk piece
goods (8670)' Inner tubes for cycles
(78.4~~), insinglass (9670)' rubber shoes
(85.2%), cycle tyres (58.8°~) and cement
(31 %) [1, I, 11: 64-70]. Overall Japa-
nese exports, however, was still not
extensive and Japan's share of the total
Malayan market in 1929 was only 2.63
percent and its share of the wholly or
mainly manufactured goods market was




Table 1 Total Imports from japan into the
Straits Settlements, 1896-1919 (in
Straits Dollars)
---_.._-_._----_ .._--- ------ ~_.------_._----
Year Imports Total S.S. % fromfrom japan Imports japan
- ------_._._~----~--
1896-1900 5,236 (OOO's) 253.6 (millions) 2.1
1901-1905 7,587 350.6 2.2
1906-1910 6,787 388.0 1.7
1911 9,038 398.0 2.3
1912 10,691 450.0 2.4
1913 12,898 479.4 2.7
1914 12,092 391.4 3.1
1915 14,918 437.5 3.4
1916 22,792 542.1 4.2
1917 34,701 646.6 5.4
1918 50,399 699.5 7.2
1919 35,699 884.7 4.0
Source: Straits Settlements Annual Reports
Notes:
a) Straits Settlements figures are used because
Malayan figures before 1921 are not available.
b) Comparisons with the period after 1921 show
that Straits Settlements figures closely ap-
proximate the Malayan import figures.
Straits Settlements figures should therefore
adequately reflect Malayan trade in this
respect.
c) The figures for 1896-1900, 1901-1905 and
1906-1910 are average annual values.
I Historical Background
Prior to the First World War, Japanese
trading links with Malaya were Iinlited.
The war dislocated the western industries
and their channels of supply. Japan
managed to capitalize on the vacuum and
its share of the Malayan market grew
significan t1y and peaked in 1918 (See
Table 1.). In 1918, a Japanese Com-
mercial Museum was opened in Singa-
pore, indicating Japanese interest In
further expansion. The museum provided
supply when the need arose.
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Source: Annual Summary of Monthly Malayan Sta-
tistics
Table 4 Imports of Articles Wholly or Mainly
Manufactured from Japan, 1928-1935
(in Straits Dollars)
Imports from Japan were noteworthy
not because they were very substantial but
because they were concentrated in the
wholly or mainly manufactured group of
goods. A look at Japan's share of this
market (Table 4) shows more precisely
the extent of Japanese competitIOn.
Within this classification, Japan's market
share rose from 4.55 percent in 1928 to
1~.27 percent in 1934.
Even these figures tend to understate
the extent of Japanese competition.
Firstly, as an official report states, "out of
the total value of $166 million in this
group in 1933, no less than $61.5 million
represented petroleum products" in which
Japan had no share [ibid., I, 11: 56].
Thus competition was pitted against an
even narrower class. Secondly, the value
criterion does not take into account the
fact that Japanese goods were much
cheaper than rival products. According to
a 1937 report, on the basis of the 256
































Table 3 Total Imports of Merchandise from
Japan, 1929-1935 (Excluding Bullion
and Specie) (in Straits Dollars)
Year Imports Total Malayan % fromfrom Japan Imports Japan
1929 23,189,934 881,170,912 2.63
1930 24,937,091 705,275,491 3.54
1931 17,895,061 453,405,207 3.95
1932 17,021,973 376,778,202 4.52
1933 26,592,862 350,251,121 7.59
1934 37,501,791 460,464,034 8.14
1935 30,405,425 466,650,253 6.52
---~--------
Sources:
II The Rise of Japanese
COlllpetition, 1930-1935
2) For a Japanese view of trade between Japan
and Malaya during the 1910s and 1920s,
see Marai no Shigen to Boeki (Tokyo: Nihon
Boeki Shinko-kai, 1944), pp. 303-315.
1) Malaya Return of Foreign Imports and Exports
[25, 1929 and 1931-1937]
2) Annual Summary of Monthly Malayan Statistics,
1930
3) The Foreign Trade of Malaya for the Year 1938
4) Malayan Statistics, Dec. 1939-1940
Note:
The following classes of imports constitutes total
merchandise.
Class I : Animals, food, drink and tobacco.
Class II: Raw materials and articles mainly
unmanufactured.
Class III: Articles wholly or mainly manufac-
tured.
and 4.). In sum, as shown in Table 2,
despite its noteworthy advances in specific
commodities, Japan posed no senous
threat to the position of the other sources
of imports.2)
The turning point came in the early
1930s when Japanese competition took a
significant upward turn. Japan's share
rose steadily from 2.63 percent in 1929 to
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which the volume is given, the quantum
of imports from Japan in 1935 was 30.6
percent of the total volume of imports [4:
14]. This was especially threatening to
the merchants who feared that the sales
of Japanese goods would directly displace
the demand for their goods.
A 1933 interview with a local manu-
facturer of rubber products, Tan Kah Kee
reveals the cut-throat nature of Japanese
competItIOn. When asked whether the
Japanese had been a threat to his rubber
shoe business, his reply was : "Yes. They
were cutting into our market in Singapore
then (1931) and now it is much worse."
Sales to the Malay States were also
declining despite the tariff barriers against
non-empire products. He said: "in J ohore
last December (1932) I could get a pair
of Japanese shoes at forty-five (Straits)
cents and the duty of fifty cents a pair
had been on for about a year then." He
claimed that the shoes were smuggled to
Johore from Singapore. He was also
undercut by Japanese bicycle tyre imports.
His cost of production was about 45 cents
while the Japanese tyres were retailed at
about 40 cents [1, II, 304, Meeting 25
(15 Jun. 1933)]. Tan Teow Nghee, the
vice-president of the Chinese piece goods
traders' guild, testified: "Within two
months of our receiving our prints from
Manchester, Japanese cloths of the same
design will be out in the market and
before we have disposed of one half of
five cases of our goods, Japanese goods will
be on the market at less than half the
price. We have suffered heavy losses."
[ibid., II, 511, Meeting 37 (17 Jul. 1933)].
Japanese cloth was not only cheaper but
the purchaser was often deceived and led
to believe that the goods were of British
manufacture. Furthermore, an established
piece goods trader said: "The Japanese
are now sending out improved designs and
it will not be very long before they will be
able to draw (their own) designs suitable
for the Malayan market." [ibid., III, 400,
Appendix 140 (26 Jan. 1934)].
Several factors contributed to the dra-
matic rise of Japanese trade. First and
most important was radical rationalization
of the Japanese industries in the late 1920s
and early 1930s. After the First World
War~ Japanese industry suffered from
wartime over-capitalization resulting in a
series of banking and exchange disorders.
To arrest these disorders and adjust its
economy to the peacetime environment,
.Japan needed a ruthless deflationary
policy. Throughout the twenties, how-
ever, the party government failed to pursue
the unpopular policy as it needed support
from the business circles. After a decade
of persistent econonlic troubles, consensus
was finally reached in 1928 on the need
for harsh deflationary measures and a
return to the gold standard. The govern-
ment took a strict balanced-budget policy
and drastically cut down public spending
and borrowing. The policy seemed suc-
cessful. In four months, domestic prices
were down to near the prewar level and
the yen almost recovered its prewar
value.3) In January 1930, Japan re-
3) See G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of
Modern Japan, 1867-1937 (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 103-105.
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turned to gold.
Unfortunately, the world depression
broke out just as Japan began to feel the
effects of the policy. Without realizing
the magnitude of the depression, the
Japanese government stuck to the de-
flationary policy for two years. The
consequences of this were disastrous in the
short run because the policy was effected
when an exactly opposit policy was needed.
However, it bore dividends in the next
decade. In retrospect, the merciless
strangulation of Japan's weaker firms was
in fact a baptism by fire from which
emerged a highly efficient economy that
managed to compete with new found
vIgour.
G.B. Sansom, the British Commercial
Counsellor in Tokyo, in his official report
Economic Conditions in Japan wrote of the
Japanese industries in 1932:
The leading feature of industry in Japan
during the period under review is its
progressive 'rationalization.' In most
of the important manufactures there
was a serious and on the whole successful
effort to improve organization and
technique, to econoITlize labour and to
reduce costs.4)
In September 1933, he further testified
before the Straits Settlements Trade Com-
mission that Japan's industries had ac-
quired skilled operatives, efficient manage-
ment, up-to-date equipment and good
4) Cited in Isoshi Asahi, The Secret of Japan's
Trade Expansion (Tokyo: The International
Association of Japan, 1934), p. 24. This
book gives details on Japan's industrial
rationalization.
378
organization [ib£d., I, 11: 59].5)
The second major factor that accounted
for Japan's sharp competition was the
cheap yen after it left the gold standard in
late 1931. During the two years, 1930
and 1931, when Japan was back on gold,
the yen was grossly over-valued and sold
heavily, causing a great outflow of gold.
By October 1931, it had become practi-
cally impossible for Japan to maintain the
gold standard because of its dwindling
specie reserve, the large expenditure re-
quired by its military action in Manchuria
and the virtual collapse of the gold
standard itself after Britain had abandoned
it in September. In early December
1931 , Japan enforced a gold embargo.
The result was a sharp depreciation of the
yen and it was this factor that pushed
Japanese exports in such a startling way.
In September 1931, when Britain left the
gold standard, the value of the yen
fluctuated between 76.5 and 93 yen per
100 Straits dollars. After December 1931,
it dropped rapidly and by March 1934 the
exchange rate had gone down to 196.5
yen to 100 dollars [ibid., I, 11: 57-58].
The economically priced Japanese goods
became even cheaper. The list of prices
below illustrates the great gulf that
5) We are not suggesting that Japan improved
industrial productivity in one stroke solely
by the deflationary policy in 1929-1931.
Needless to say, it had been constantly
improving before the period. The ruthless
deflationary policy in those years, however,
intensified the rationalizing effect of the
world depression and made Japanese
manufactures more competitive than those
of the nations also affected by the depression
but not the policy.
- ._~~,--
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$5.00 jar, 20 kilos.
$5.50 pikul
$1.60 per 32/33 lb reel








$0.60 to $1.00 per dozen
$8.00 per gross
¢30 to ¢35 per pair
¢60 per dozen
$4.50 to $5.00 per case of
48 tins
European
$9.50 jar, 20 kilos.
$6.75 pikul
$2.00 per 32/33 lb reel








$1.25 to $2.00 per dozen
$11.00 per gross
$1.10 per pair (Tan Kah
Kee local ¢65)
$1.20 per dozen
$7.25 to $14.00 per case of
48 tins
Source: SSTCR 1933-34 [1, I,ll: 60]
existed between Japanese and European
goods.
Two addi tional factors, low wage level
and Japan's luck In obtaining raw
materials at reasonable cost, contributed to
the highly competitive price of Japanese
goods. The former was a result of the
agricultural depression which impelled a
large-scale transference of workers from
the rural to urban sectors and kept down
industrial wages. The latter was an
advantage Japanese industry drew from
the fluctuating value of the yen and
international prices. Immediately after
the devaluation, when the exchange rate
factor made raw material imports more
expensive, Japan's industry operated with
materials purchased before the yen's
depreciation. By the time stocks ran out,
the world depression had lowered the price
of primary produce which Japan had to
import [ibid., I, 11: 58].
Japan's ability to supply its products at
relatively low prices fitted in well with the
poor economic conditions in Malaya.6)
In many cases, the poor could only afford
the inexpensive Japanese goods. Slightly
better off groups found Japanese prices
more palatable, provided the goods were
of acceptable quality. European firms
that had hitherto purchased small quanti-
ties from Japan began to change their
policies since they found it "impossible to
purchase goods from the United Kingdom
6) For example, rubber tappers' wages in the
Straits Settlements ranged between 50-60
Straits cents for adult male Indian labourers
and 40-45 cents for adult Indian females in
1929 but this was reduced to 28 and 24 cents
respectively in 1933. Straits Settlements Annual
Reports 1929 and 1934.
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or the continent of Europe at competitive
prices" [ibid., I, 11: 59]. One may say
that the depression drastically narrowed
the quality goods market for British and
European products while expanding the
market for cheap Japanese goods.
It seems true, however, the Japanese
companies were very competitive and
often resorted to aggressive marketing to
ensure sales. Sometimes they were un-
scrupulous in manipulating multiple
dealers so as to maximize sales. The
Straits Settlements Trade Commission
accused thenl of "failing to protect dealers
by quoting a (sic) second and third dealer
prices lower than those given to the first"
[ibid., I, 11: 60]. The Commission,
moreover, received reliable information
that Japanese manufacturers sold their
products at lower prices than would appear
necessary to meet competition [loco cit.].
This apparently strange practice requires
some explanation. The 'very low price'
policy may have been necessary to over-
come the discrimination against Japanese
goods which were believed to be of inferior
quality. In the 1920s the phrase 'made
in Japan' had been synonymous with poor
quality products. Although the quality
of Japanese goods improved constantly,
the image continued throughout the next
decade. In 1933, G.B. Sansom pointed
out that Japanese goods no longer merited
the criticism directed against them in
earlier years because they now offered
good value for money [ibid., I, 11: 59].
Japanese exporter, nevertheless, had to
fight the fixed image of their goods. A
substantial price difference had to be
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maintained to overcome the differences in
quality. Furthermore, higher prices may
well have made the goods unaffordable for
the masses.
The lower prices led to condemnation
of the Japanese for dumping. Witnesses
interviewed by the Trade Commission
often claimed that all Japanese trade was
subsidized by the government, either by
the direct grant of funds or by such
nlethods as assuming liability for losses
incurred by traders through selling at
uneconomic prices or incurring bad debts,
and that Japanese trade consisted largely
of 'dumping,' regardless of price [loco cit.].
This charge was refuted by Sansonl who
said that the "finances of the Japanese
Government were quite incapable of
disbursing the sums necessary for sub-
sidization on a wide scale" [loco cit.]. Not
only was the 10 million yen assistance
given by the government to Japanese
industries insignificant when distributed
throughout the different sectors of the
economy, but it was also primarily directed
at encouraging export trade through the
improvement of grading, selection of
quality of goods for export and the en-
couragement of rationalization [loco cit.].
Apparently, the Malayan merchants ut-
tered these heart-felt but inaccurate ac-
cusations in the heat of fierce competition.
The controversial point was not whether
the Japanese government subsidized its
exports but whether large-scale dumping
actually occurred at all. This point was
investigated by the Commission and it
only prescribed further investigation when
specific charges were made. Official reports
----- - -
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show, however, that the Japanese did
practise dumping in certain commodities,
such as tinned milk, cement and coal
[ibid., II, 253, Meeting 19 (31 May
1933)],7) but the initiative seems to have
come from the individual exporters rather
than the government.
Between 1930 and 1934, Japan extended
its hold over markets in which it had had
a secure foothold, for example, cotton
piece goods, artificial silk piece goods,
inner tubes for cycles, cotton blankets,
cycle accessories, hollow ware, silk piece
goods and cycle tyres. Moreover, Japan
made rapid intrusion into the markets of
new product lines. More noticeable
among them were woollen cloth, wire
nails and staples, wire, tiles, plywood
cases, hosiery, canned sardines, cotton
sarongs, slendangs and kains, cast iron
pipes, tubes and fittings and asbestos
manufactures [ibid., I, 11: 55, 64-70J.
Japan, in fact, encroached on many other
commodity markets during this era and
posed effective competition to the other
major sources of import, namely, Europe,
America, China, Hong Kong, Siam,
British India and the Netherlands East
Indies.
For the majority of the local population,
however, Japanese economic intrusion did
not constitute competition. Malaya's out-
put was mainly in primary products and
did not compete directly with the manu-
factured imports from Japan. Furthermore,
7) Reference to Japanese 'Merry' brand milk
being sold in Japan at the equivalent of
S$9.14 and in Singapore at S$6.50 per case.
See also SSTCR 1933-34 [1, I, 11: 59].
the local businessmen were more often
petty traders and exporters of primary
produce rather than manufacturers.8) The
increased Japanese trade proved to be a
boon for local merchants during the
depression years when more expensive
items were difficult to sell. In fact,
Japanese imports were so indispensable
that they destined the 1931 anti-Japanese
boycotts to an early doom.
III The Failure of the
1931 Boycotts
The Mukden Incident on 18 September
1931 signalled the beginning of the
Japanese attack on Manchuria and it
sparked off anti-Japanese boycotts by the
Chinese merchants in Malaya.9) The
boycotts, however, were short-lived and
largely ineffective. Quantitative data on
Japanese imports into Malaya for the 10
months following the incident (Table 6)
show that the boycott was effective only
for a few months from November 1931.
By March 1932, even though the boycotts
were outwardly maintained, there were
already signs that momentum was being
lost quickly.
Although Chinese merchants tempo-
rarily stopped importing Japanese cotton
piece goods, the overall effect was moder-
ated by the increased imports by Indian
8) A quick scan through the Straits Directories
published in the 1930s will confirm the
suspicion that very few local businessmen
were engaged in manufacturing activities.
9) For a review of the nine anti-Japanese
boycotts by the Malayan Chinese merchants
from 1908 to 1937, see Marai no Shigen to
Boeki, pp. 318-328.
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Table 6 japan's Market Share in Selected Com-
modities,ju1y 1931 to August 1932 (%)
Month Y Co~n r;ece Galvanized Hollowear 00 * W(Printed) Iron are
_._,_._-~_.-
~._--
july 1931 88.4 48.6 25.2
August 81.6 47.9 28.5
September 82.7 41.3 33.0
October 89.2 10.9 26.4
November 54.1 2.3 25.5
December 52.7 18.2
january 1932 50.0 1.1 16.0
February 48.4 14.2
March 56.5 22.1
April 55.5 1.1 14.4
May 68.4 21.3
june 62.5 22.0
july 65.3 7.2 31.4
August 75.6 8.4 27.5
Source: C.O. [5, 273/583/92110]
Note: ... The boycott action on galvanized iron
was particularly effective because it was
controlled by the strongly anti-japanese
Hokkien merchants.
and Arab merchants. The increased Im-
ports, however, did not all go into con-
sumption in Malaya as Chinese middlemen
prevented their wide distribution. The
result was a large increase in re-exports
between October 1931 and March 1932.
Exchange rate fluctuations which coin-
cided with the boycott made Malayan
exports to Siam and Sumatra more
competitive and profitable than before.
Obviously, the non-Chinese merchants
capitalized on both factors to handle
increased amounts of Japanese goods [5,
273/583/92110, Report of H.M.'s Trade
Commissioner to C.O., 30 Sept. 1932].
The figures for Japan's share of the wholly
or mainly manufactured goods market
show that the boycotts had no significant
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long term effect. They made impact only
for about six to eight months. In fact,
Japan's share of the market rose from 6.18
to 7.46 percent between 1930 and 1932
(See Table 4.).
By March 1932, cases were cited of
Chinese peddlers who purchased Japanese
piece goods from Arab and Indian mer-
chants and sold them in short lengths
[loco cit.]. Furthermore, Mitsui and
Company and Shimoda and Company
reportedly had large shipments of piece
goods from Japan on order due to arrive
in Singapore in the middle ofJune. These
were for sale to High Street (Singapore)
dealers who were said to resume handling
of Japanese piece goods. Several non-
Chinese dealers were also selling Japanese
piece goods to the Chinese after camou-
flaging any marks bearing the country of
origin [loco cit.]. After April 1932, figures
for the import of Japanese cotton piece
goods confirmed that the boycott had in
effect ended even though it was still
maintained officially.
Two major factors accounted for the
boycotts' lack of staying power. l\tfore
fundamental was economic necessity and
the other factor was the limited political
significance of the Mukden Incident.
While the Chinese frowned upon the
Japanese actions In 1vfanchuria, the
economic prerogative forced them to
rationalize away their need for economIC
retaliation. Although the boycotts would
injure the Japanese economy, they would
also be detrimental to the Chinese mer-
chants' own well being and, moreover,
hurt the already depressed local economy.
--------- - - -~ -
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The boycotts would further increase unem-
ployment and hence the suffering of the
local population. 10) For instance, many
Teochew hollow ware importers were in
debt to the Japanese and were unable to
sustain the boycott for long [loco cit.]. The
relative insignificance of Manchuria, un-
familiar to local Chinese who were almost
exclusively from the coastal areas in South
China, contributed to the early collapse
of the boycotts.
By August 1932, expansion of Japanese
shares of the manufactured goods market
had resumed. Japanese competition was
particularly serious in commodities such as
textiles (artificial and cotton piece goods
and sarongs) and in this Britain was a
principal sufferer. This group of articles
constituted about half of the total Japanese
merchandise imports in 1933 [I, I, II:
56-57]. In Britain, Japanese competition
was claimed to have brought about
"regional unemployment, labour trans-
ference difficulties, problems of industrial
reform, and other economic and social
corollaries of a shrinking of export trade"
[6: xvii]. The British response took the
form of textile quotas. These were im-
posed in Malaya and other British colonies
in ~1ay 1934.
VI The Textile Quotas
Prior to 1934, the Straits ports were
10) In 1930, at least 5,000 Chinese in Singapore
were jobless and would likely soon be
destitute. See Yeo Eng Leng, Effects of
Great Depression on Singapore (un-
published B.A. Honours academic exercise,
Duiversity of Singapore, 1972), p. 17.
outside the main framework of the imperial
preference system. The Federated Malay
States and Unfederated Malay States
were also little sheltered from the uncom-
promising Japanese trade drive as the
tariff policy of British 11alaya had tradi-
tionally been extremely liberal. In 1933
the preferential rate on Empire-made
textiles was 10 percent and the full tariff
rate was 20 percent while the price
difference between Japanese and British
textiles was approximately 90 percent
[7: 392-394J. Moreover, due to a short-
age of customs staff and a technicality, the
imperial preference scheme was poorly
implemented [1, I, 20]. Imperial pref-
erence, therefore, was an ineffective
barrier against the massive inflow of cheap
Japanese goods [ibid., I, 20: 156J.11>
The nlember of the Trade Commission
1933-1934 were alarmed at the rapid
influx of Japanese goods as this trend
conjured the spectre of eventual Japanese
domination over the entire manufactured
goods market. They stressed the urgency
of finding methods to deal with it, but
could not reach a firm conclusion on what
measure to adopt. Each of the four
proposals forwarded had its own disad-
vantages. The alternatives were:
1) To impose tariffs in the Straits
Settlements and increase those in the
Malay States.
2) To mark all goods with the name of
country of origin.
-------------
II) Imperial preference is defined as a scheme
of preferential rates of duties on goods
consigned from and grown, produced or
manufactured in the British Empire.
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3) To introduce a system of quotas on
japan's major import items.
4) To levy a depreciated exchange tax
on all japanese goods (i.e., nullify
the advantages gained by the yen
depreciation) [ibid., I, 11: 61-63].
The tariff increases were objected to
because a sufficiently high tariff barrier
would raise domestic prices and exceed
the limits of just taxation on the poorer
classes. The Commission aptly pointed
out the dilemma that "any effective
preference must be unreasonable and any
reasonable preference must be ineffective"
[ibid., I, 11: 61]. An exchange tax was
considered unsatisfactory as the Com-
mission feared that japan might further
be able to lower its prices. This shows
official apprehension for japanese competi-
tiveness even when japanese goods were,
so to speak, put on a "basis of fair compe-
tition" [ibid., I, 11: 62]. Furthermore,
the implenlentation of such a tax system
would require restrictive measures to
prevent evasions and interfere with the
Straits Settlements' free port status. The
marking of goods with country of origin
was refuted as it was "extremely doubtful
that the measure would offset the over-
whelming appeal of cheap japanese
goods." Finally, the quota system was
seen as a hindrance to the entrepot
function of the Straits ports. Hence, no
solution emerged from the Commission's
deliberations [ibid., I, 11: 61-63].
Meanwhile, an Empire-wide restrictive
measure was forthcoming from London.
The Lancashire cotton industry had been
rapidly losing its share of the colonial
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markets to the japanese. Between 1929
and 1933, while world trade in cotton
piece goods dropped from 8,000 to 5,000
million square yards, Lancashire's exports
to the British colonies fell, but japan's
exports of cotton goods to the colonies
were increasing [8: 67]. By March 1934,
negotiations between Britain and japan to
divide the world markets had broken
down [9, II: 253].12) The British govern-
ment decided to impose quotas on cotton
and artificial silk piece goods in its colonies.
I t was announced in the House of Com-
mons on 7 May 1934 and put into effect
immediately [loco cit.].
The textile quotas could not specifically
discriminate against japan because of its
most-favoured-nation rights as guaranteed
by the 1911 Anglo-japanese Commercial
Treaty. The quotas were imposed on all
countries outside the British empire so as
to make it seem non-discriminatory. Yet,
they were designed to penalize japanese
imports heavily, as they were based on the
average imports from each foreign country
during the years 1927-1931, the period
before japan's rapid trade expansion [8:
69-70]. japan's yearly quota, 34,668,423
linear yards, was only about 39 percent of
retained japanese textile imports in 1933
(See Table 7.). The seven classes of
regulated textiles were cotton grey un-
bleached, white bleached, woven coloured
cotton, cotton sarongs, artificial silk piece
12) For Japanese insiders' views of the pro-
ductivity gap between the British and
Japanese textile industries and the nego-
tiations, see Ando Yoshihiro, ed., ShOwa
Seiji Keizaishi e no SMgen I (Tokyo: Mainichi
Shimbunsha, 1972), pp. 283-306.
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Table 7 Imports of Regulated Textiles into Malaya, Subject to Quotas, 1933-1938
(in Linear Yards)
Country 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Japan 88,305,000 33,222,762 24,087,294 34,636,123 34,208,167 25,352,279
China 8,872,000 6,750,487 7,969,146 11,689,824 10,287,546 6,185,454
N.E.I. 2,549,000 2,291,746 2,733,473 2,902,242 2,945,390 2,833,926
Fr. India 1,498,000 854,773 1,935,754 2,898,058 2,489,534 1,333,469
Source: Report on Quotas
Notes:
a) 1934 figures for China, Netherlands East Indies and French India are com-
piled for the period 7 May to 31 December.
b) 1934 figure for Japan is compiled for the period 1 June to 31 December.
c) 1933 figures are estimated net imports (i.e., gross imports minus estimates for
re-exports). Refer to Report on Quotas, 1935 [11: 480] for details on estima-
tion problems.
d) Japan's textile quota allocation was 34,668,423 yearly.
e) In 1934, Japan exceeded its quota by 10,544,147 yards and this amount was
subsequently absorbed in the 1935 quota.
goods other than sarongs, artificial silk
sarongs, dyed cotton and printed cotton
[10: 48J,13) in which japan was partic-
ularly competitive.
The Japanese were indignant about the
veiled but obvious discrimination and
representations were made through their
consulate, but the diplomatic appeals
came to naught. 14) The Japanese im-
porters and their Chinese middlemen had
to rely on their ingenuity to moderate the
effects of the stringent restrictions. The
quotas reduced japanese textiles, over and
above the quota limits, through illegal or
semi-legal means.
V The Effects of the Quotas
The official statistics show that Japanese
13) Textiles with 50 percent or more of cotton
or artificial silk or both combined are
included in this category.
14) See Dispatches Straits Settlements to Secretary
of State, from Consul-General of Japan to
Colonial Secretary and vice versa, 7, 27 and
29 June 1934.
imports of regulated textiles were greatly
reduced (See Table 7.). The sharp
decline registered between 1935 and 1937,
however, must be taken with some reser-
vations because of clandestine entries of
japanese textiles. Mostly, they took the
form of made-up goods on which no
quota was imposed till 1938.
By June 1935, there was a report that
"a number of Chinese tailors had recently
moved from Singapore to the neighbouring
Dutch Islands in the Rhio Archipelago"
[11: 484J. This apparently innocent
flight of tailors to Riau was significant
enough to warrant mention in the 1935
report on the quota system. Economic
and social conditions in Riau coupled with
its strategic geographical location made it
an ideal smuggling centre. The Riau
Archipelago lay just south of Singapore
and was outside the Netherlands Indies
customs zone [loco cit.]. It consisted of
about 1,500 small islands where Straits
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Table 8 Exports of Piece Goods to Riau Archi-
pelago, 1935-1938 (in Linear Yards)
January 21,520 307,157 256,847 78,855
February 8,276 618,183 202,434 23,207
March 37,220 601,777 434,662 49,072
April 97,080 432,235 408,943 66,698
May 244,944 407,103 413,651 36,076
June 662,918 470,742 366,829 43,504
July 401,168 448,636 544,683 48,981
August 410,113 334,420 520,272 38,501
September 422,851 247,981 168,484 36,313
October 515,966 367,585 97,74:7 39,084:
November 547,760 386,581 81,033 19,200
December 435,671 292,972 8,292 14,273
Total 3,805,4874,915,372 3,503,877 493,764
Monthly 317,124 409,614 291,990 41,147Average
Source: Report on Quotas, 1937 [18: 642]
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money was freely used and its roughly
350,000 population was predominantly
Chinese [5, 273(638/50010].
From May 1935, there was a notable
and persistent increase in the 're-exports'
of piece goods to Riau where they were
converted into made-up goods and sent
back to Singapore. Re-export depots
were established in Singapore and Penang
in June 1934 and textiles that passed
through these depots were exempt from
regulation [10: 39]. The figures in Table
8 on re-exports to Riau clearly indicate
their nature. They increased markedly
in 1935, after the quota system had been
introduced, and maintained the 1935
level with some fluctuations until Sep-
tember 1937 when the Chinese merchants'
boycotts of Japanese goods began.
The sudden surge of textile trade
between Singapore and Riau became a
Month 1935 1936 1937 1938
serious problem chiefly because it allowed
"fraudulent entry, either by open entry as
made-up goods roughly cut to appear like
partially made-up goods, but capable of
being converted back into piece goods or
by frank evasion of quota regulations"
[11 : 485]. The semi-legal entry of 'made-
up' goods in fact constituted smuggling.
It is certain that a very large proportion of
the Singapore-Riau trade in made-up
goods was of dubious authenticity since the
handling of genuine made-up goods would
Incur the attendant complications of
sizes and variations in fashion. Moreover,
piece goods were always readily saleable,
particularly in a market like Singapore or
Penang, whereas the saleability of made-
up goods was strictly limited [10: 44].
A description of some of these 'made-
up' goods will show the intention to fully
exploit loop-holes in the quota system. A
Straits Times article in August 1936 read:
A few days ago a reliable informant was
shown a weird looking garment of
Japanese origin. It masqueraded as a
pair of trousers, and it certainly bore
some slight resemblance to that article
of much utility if little aesthetic value.
A very light band round the waist was
cut and the 2 men pulled in opposite
directions. Lo and behold, what had
been a rather unusual looking pair of
trousers became about 30 yards15) of
15) "30 yards" should probably be read "13
yards." It is inconceivable that even
oversize trousers would use 30 yards of cloth
and, moreover, an official report described
a pair of trousers that disintegrated into 12
yards of material. See Report on Quotas,
1936 [12: 464].
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27-inch wide cotton shirting! In ad-
dition to the unusual waist measure-
ments of the trousers, the material had
been folded up and down inside the
legs, giving a multiple thickness which
was not obvious on a superficial ex-
amination [2,14 Aug. 1946: 10J.
Abnormally huge mattress covers, bolster
and pillow cases and shirts were also
reported to have been imported. White
cloth sacks, about the size of an unsewn
sarong each, allegedly entered Singapore
and it was discovered that these were later
unpicked, printed and put on sale as
sarongs [12: 464]. 'Scarves' measuring
72 by 36 inches with unfinished edges
that were hoped to pass off as fringes were
allowed to enter freely. If the fringes at
the ends were cut away, an official report
states, a piece of rayon lace measuring 68
by 36 inches would remain [loco cit.].
In 1936, a lively trade in 'mosquito
nets' also developed from the adjacent
Karimon Islands. Between September
1935 and March 1936, 53,110 rnosquito
nets were imported from the islands where
trade with Singapore had formerly been
non-existent. Specirnens of these 'nets'
were unusually large, each net being
equivalent to about forty linear yards of
piece goods. l\10re absurd was the fact
that the 'nets' were by no means the
netting which is usually associated with the
mosquito net, but were ordinary cotton or
artificial silk material, often of double
thickness [11: 486]. Obviously, these
'nets' were totally impractical in the
tropical climate since they would not only
exclude the tiniest mosquito and sand-fly
but would also "stop the entrance of air
to the unfortunate sleeper beneath." The
stiching together was so flimsy, it was
reported, that "a light pull was all that was
necessary to disintegrate the ingenious
made-up mosquito net into its component
lengths of piece goods" [12: 464].
Furthermore, proof had been obtained
"of misdeclaration of the artificial silk
content of certain goods of mixed natural
and artificial silk weaving" [11: 486-
487]. Although goods that contained 50
percent or more of cotton or of artificial
silk or both on a weight basis were to be
regulated, there were difficulties in ascer-
taining the cotton or artificial silk content.
Dealers claimed that it was an easy matter
to circumvent the restrictive measures.
According to the Straits Times:
Although the novice, or clumsy arnateur,
either here or in the country ofshipment,
may give cause to suspect an inaccurate
declaration or a false invoice, those that
have been in the business long enough
and know their 'sundries' as well as their
piece goods will find it an easy matter,
on the strength of former genuine
import declarations and invoices, to
make false documen ts which even the
shrewdest of businessmen will find
difficult to suspect, even if the weight
and the volume of the packages in
relation to the goods declared are
carefully scrutinised [2, 15 Jan. 1936:
16].
L.A. Mills estimates that smuggling
reached seven million yards in 1937 [13:
158J. The figure should be taken with
caution, since no mention is made of the
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method of estimation, but it is perhaps the
most reliable available, as Mills was a
contemporary writer in a position to
interview the relevant official. FrOlll the
available statistics one can safely say that
smuggling exceeded five million yards in
1936.16)
A more subtle form of evasion was the
import of Japanese piece goods processed
outside Japan. Those processing countries
would serve as intermediate ports for the
deflection of trade and bills of lading
would be made out at these intermediate
ports [14: 492]. Among the more nota-
ble processing centres were French India
(Pondicherry, Karikal and Yanam) and
British India. In 1937, the Federated
Malay States customs found that French
Indian sarees bleached, dyed and printed
in French India were originally 44-inch
grey shirting material from Japan [15:
649]. Table 7 shows the rapid rise of
textile imports from French India after
1934, when the quotas were imposed, and
its equally rapid fall after 1937--more
than 50 percent fall in the year 1937-
1938--following the outbreak of the
anti-Japanese boycotts. It strongly sug-
gests that Japanese goods were in fact
deflected through French India into
Malaya. It was also hinted that Japanese
cloth came in through British India,
although no direct statements were issued.
Malayan imports of Indian sarongs fell
16) This is deduced from the comparative fall
of piece good re-exports to Riau from
4,915,372 yards in 1936 to 493,764 yards in
1938. Anti-Japanese boycotts after 1937
effectively stopped smuggling of Japanese
piece goods.
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from 6,887,495 in 1937 to 2,858,843 yards
in 1938 [16: 349]. Apparently, evasion
of quotas by using intermediate ports was
difficult for the British Administration to
monitor and control, but the Chinese
dealers were in a position to identify
processed goods of Japanese origin for
subsequent boycott.
The overall effect of the quota on
Japanese textile imports was therefore
significantly toned down by evasion,
direct smuggling and increases In non-
regulated textiles. In 1936, it was re-
ported that Japanese goods were so much
in evidence in Malaya that a large per-
centage of the loss in its piece goods was
probably being counter-balanced by gain
in made-up goods and silk piece goods
[17: 469]. Imports of low quality
bleached and dyed silk had been greatly
increased (See Table 9.). The two pre-
dominant sources of silk imports were
japan and China, and japan held roughly
80 percent of the market between 1934
and 1937.
Although Japanese textile imports may
have been noticeably lowered by the
quotas, Japanese competition as a whole
was certainly not stifled. The restrictions








Source: Addendum to Report on Quotas,
1936 [17: 469]
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Source: Adapted from Annual Summary
of Monthly Malayan Statistics
of the quota system were clearly not
impervious and, furthermore, approxi-
mately 50 percent of Japanese imports
still lay beyond the scope of the textile
quotas. Thus, as seen III Table 10,
overall Japanese imports were only
partially reduced and brisk competItIOn
still continued to the dismay of Japan's
rival importers.
Some legislative measures were taken to
check the rampant inflow of Japanese
made-up goods. These included an
ordinance, passed in September, giving the
Registrar of Textile Quotas power to
decide whether dubious goods were to be
classed as regulated textiles and the
extension of the quotas to cover made-up
goods on 1 January 1938 [16: 339; 18:
649]. The legislative actions do not
seem to have been very effective. Although
the imports of textiles fell drastically in
1938, the fundamental reason for the fall
was not the new laws but the outbreak of
the Second Sino-Japanese War in July
1937.
VI Japanese COlllpetition
between 1935 and 1937
Despite the dampening effect of the
textile quotas, spirited Japanese com-
petition was still the order of the day in
1936. A Straits Times article recorded
that "Rarely a day passes without some
further evidence reaching us of the
severity of the Japanese grip on Malayan
trade." [2, 7 Aug. 1936: 10]. The J apa-
nese were competitive not only in direct
visible imports but also in invisible items,
such as shipping, banking and insurance.
Japanese firms were allegedly so well
organized that it was "possible to trace
connections between the producers of
rubber, the buyers and the brokers, the
shippers, the firms who insure the ship-
ments and the bankers ,,,Tho finance the
transactions" [ibid., 20 Jul. 1936: 10].
With this highly integrated mutual benefit
system, the Japanese concerns were able
to quote as much as three-eighths to half
a cent a pound higher for the purchase
of rubber in Malaya [lac. cit.]. Through
close cooperation and willingness to accept
lower profit ruargins, the japanese ship-
ping companies increased their market
share from 0.3 percent in 1933 to about
40 percent in late 1935 and early 1936
[ibid., 22 Jul. 1936: 10; 13: 169].
The japanese also endeavoured to
capture the trade in pineapples grown and
canned in Malaya for export to Britain.
The precondition for a product to qualify
for preferential tariff was that 50 percent
of the finished item must be of Empire
OrIgIn. Since the domestically grown
pineapples themselves accounted for 50
percent, the goods packed by japanese
labour and material could enter Britain
under a preferential rate and compete
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Table II The Plate Imports from Japan,
1932-1937






Source: Malaya Return of Foreign Imports and Ex-
ports [25]
with the wholly British Malayan product.
The growth of the Japanese pineapple
canning industry was reflected by the
tremendous increase in tin plate imports
from Japan after 1935. The whole of these
imports went to the Japanese canners.
This branch of competition affected
some of local pineapple canning firms
such as Lee Pineapple Company, Sin
Tack Bee Company, Malayan Pineapple
Company and .lit Hin and Company.
Moreover, the Malayan pineapple in-
dustry was faced with stiff Japanese
competition in the United Kingdom which
had traditionally been the main market for
Malayan canned pineapple exports [19,
1936] .17) The situation was further ag-
gravated by the fact that by 1936, price
agreement formerly in force among the
packers had given way to cut-throat com-
petition, which led to uncertainty in the
trade and below-cost prices [20, 1937, I:
335]. One of the reasons why Lee Kong
Chian of Lee Pineapple Company became
17) 75 percent of Malaya's exports went to the
United Kingdom in 1936. The trade was
depressed during this period for two reasons.
First, the exports to Britain had been of
deplorably low quality. Second, there was
competition from another cheap fruit,
namely, Japanese canned mandarin oranges.
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a leader of the 193 7 anti-Japanese boycotts
could have been that Japanese compe-
tition had affected his business.
The Japanese merchants were tireless
in their efforts to capture the ~1alayan
market by trying new marketing methods.
For example, the Straits Times commercial
correspondent remarked that a Japanese
dairy combine had invited some local
milk dealers to visit their factories in
Japan, all expenses being defrayed by the
combine. This was important, as a large
section of the population could not be
reached by newspaper or poster advertise-
ments, and a good deal often depended
on the good will of the dealer in intro-
ducing a new line or getting the maximum
support for established lines [2, 17 J ul.
1935: 16J.
Trade exhibitions to promote their
goods was another new marketing method
employed by the Japanese. In July
1935, they organized a travelling exhi-
bition ofJapanese products at the Japanese
Commercial Museum In Singapore.
Articles exhibited ranged from textiles
and machinery to marine products and
canned and sundry goods of all descrip-
tions [ibid., 25 Jul. 1935: 10]. In Oc-
tober 1936, a 'floating fair' on the Osaka
Shosen Kaisha vessel Buenos Aires Maru
came to Singapore. On board were 20
Japanese businessmen who were anxious
to come into contact with local merchants
so as to promote their "bicycles, bi-
noculars, garters, gramophones, motor
cars, surveying instruments, watches,
fridges, ice-boxes, dental instruments, auto
parts and 'peculiar' things that have never
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Table 12 Japan's Share of Malayan Trade in
Selected Items, 1935-1936
Source: Adapted from Malaya Return qf Foreign
Imports and Exports [25]
Artificial Silk Piece Goods 90.0 88.1
Canned Sardines 93.9 95.0
Cement 47.1 41.1
Printed Cotton Piece Goods 57.4 59.5
Cotton Underwear 68.4 59.8
Crockery and Porcelain 66.5 62.3
Fancy Goods 91.6 71.4
Glass and Glassware 68.0 66.7
Hollow Ware 73.3 78.6
Household Cotton Goods 69.6 64.0(Made-up)
Rubber Shoes 92.0 92.5
Silk Piece Goods 81.4 76.5
Toys and Games 59.8 61.0
Cycle Tyres 82.5 71.3
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mittee set up to enquire into Japanese
competition that was monopolizing the
bazaar trade of Malaya [22, Aug. 1936,
B50]. His action can be explained by the
fact that he was a managing director and
attorney within the Ho Hong industrial
complex which, among other things,
produced cement, soap, perfume and
operated a steamship line, whose markets
were threatened by Japanese competition
[19, 1936]. Evidently, Tay voiced the
sentiments of his fellow Ho Hong directors
and those of the domestic mercantile
community that were affected.
In this period, Japan dominated the
import items listed in Table 12. The
degree of indignation and fear over Japa-
nese competition can be seen in a Straits
Times article stating that the Japanese
were upsetting values and confounding
the trading community in every place they
1935 (%) 1936 (%)Item
made their debut in Malaya" [ibid., 24
Oct. 1936: 12]. These exhibitions pro-
vided an excellent means of advertising
and served to foster new trading links
between Japanese and l\1alayan business-
luen. Indeed, these exhibitions brought
Japanese exports right to the doorstep of
the local dealers who would otherwise
have been ignorant of their nlarket
potential.
Part of the Japanese success, however,
was effected through less savoury means
such as commercial piracy or imitation of
well known brands. Among the cases
disclosed in 1936 were counterfeit Lock-
heed brake fluid sold under the name
Bulldog, imitation Lux soaps and Parker
pens [loco cit.]. Each of these counterfeit
products could be traced to Japanese
sources and significant gains were made
by these commercial pirates. Genuine
Parker pens sold at S$l 7.50 each while the
imitation article was retailed at S$1.50 to
S$2. Bona fide importers were certainly
concerned as the great difference in price
persuaded many to shun their imports for
the cheaper albeit relatively shoddy Japa-
nese imitation [ibid., 12 Oct. 1936: 10;
21: 30].
In 1936, Japanese competltlOn was so
serious that the local business circles were
constantly requesting checks or controls
on Japanese encroachment. The Straits
Times regularly called for restrictions on
behalf of the shippers, bankers and
merchant houses. Protest also came from
an unofficial member of the Legislative
Council, namely, Tay Lian Tack. He
requested that there should be a com-
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entered. It warned that control was
imperative because growing Japanese
economic strength would inevitably cause
"demands for a measure of influence in
other directions" [2, 14 Sept. 1936: 10].
By 1936, the outlook of the mercantile
community, represented by the Singapore
and Penang Chambers of Commerce,
changed significantly. The Chairman of
the Singapore Chamber of Commerce
said in October 1936 that:
Public opinion had undergone a re-
markable change in the past few years,
and the refusal of assistance would
produce far louder protests than any
announcement of plans to negate the
advantages acruing to Japan [ibid., 1
Oct. 1936: 10].
As the quota regulations had not seemed
to have worked, it was widely hoped that
further restrictions would soon be imposed
on Japanese competition.
The legislative restriction, however,
did not come to pass and in October 1936,
the Governor Sir Shenton Thomas only
reassured the merchants that the situation
was "being carefully studied" [22, Oct.
1936, B62]. It was fairly clear that no
further protection of the local merchants
by the government against Japanese
competition was forthcoming. The local
merchants became more pessimistic about
their ability to compete when faced with
the intense commercial nationalism and
capacity for cooperation shown by the
Japanese. There appeared to be no hope
of increasing their share, for example, of
the textile market until Lancashire could
compete with Japan on a price basis.
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But they were blessed with good fortune.
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
in July 1937 triggered off an extensive
anti-Japanese boycott, which signalled the
denlise of Japanese competition In
Malayan trade.
VII The Anti-Japanese Boycotts,
1937-1941
The post-July 1937 boycotts were so
vigorously enforced that within a year,
the value of Japanese exports to Malaya
dropped by 68 percent from 71.3 to 22.9
million yen [23: 31 7] . There was no
significant recovery before the Pacific
War. A number of factors contributed to
the success of the 1937 boycotts. Firstly,
Japanese military aggression in China was
far more significant than it had been in
1931. In September 1937, the Secretary
of Chinese Affairs noted that:
Formerly it was approximately true to
say that Chinese in Malaya from the
southern maritime provinces of China
were not greatly moved by affairs in
north China.... But the achievements
and propaganda of the Nanking govern-
ment during the last few years combined
with the personality of Chiang Kai
Shek had undoubtedly impressed
Chinese overseas who are now more
prepared to give more heed to national
affairs in China instead of restricting
their interests to the affairs of their own
ancestral towns and provinces [5, 273/
628/50455].
The Malayan Chinese were agitated be-
cause, betweenJuly 1937 and 1940, not only
had important cities such as Peking and
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Nanking fallen but their home provinces
had also been occupied by the Japanese.
Secondly, as suggested above, in 1937,
the Malayan Chinese were far more
patriotic than they had been in 1931.
There were two major reasons for the
sharp rise in nationalism. First, since the
early thirties, the Nanking government
had actively promoted patriotism in the
Malayan Chinese community through its
consulates and Kuomintang branches [24:
120-121]. Second, a more fundamental
factor was the spread of Chinese education
SInce the 1920s in Malaya as a spill-over of
the May Fourth nationalist movement in
China. I t had instilled patriotism in young
local Chinese who were to become active
members of the community in the 1930s. 18)
Thirdly, in 1937 the economic standing
of the population was far better than that
in 1931 and allowed most merchants to
JOIn the boycotts without seriously
jeopardizing their livelihood. Between
1931 and 1937, the price of Malaya's
principal exports, rubber and tin, had
increased by 326 percent and 99 percent
respectively. Malaya's total merchandise
imports had risen from 377 million Straits
dollars in 1931 to 680 million in 1937
[20, 1931 and 1937; 25, 1931 and 1937].
Fourthly, the local government took a
tolerant attitude towards the boycotts.
Stephen Leong sums up his paper, "The
Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-
Japanese War," by saying that the anti-
Japanese movement was successful largely
18) See H.E. Wilson, Social Engineering in
Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University
Press, 1978), p. 60.
because of the goodwill and understanding
of the colonial authorities [23: 320].
Although the British adopted harsh
measures to check the violent and illegal
aspects of the movement, an official
Japanese source complained that "they
were soft in controlling Chinese economic
protestation" [24: 22]. The British
understandably took an approving attitude
towards the boycotts not only because
they were against Japan's military action
In China, which threatened British
interests there, but because the boycotts
effectively resolved the problem of
Japanese competition that had plagued
the British. The massive suppression of
Japanese competition meant increased
trade for Britain and other countries that
had been edged out only a few years
earlier, as clearly shown in Table 13.
Finally, the success of the boycotts
itself worked to make them even more
successful. Mass support for any kind of
anti-Japanese action was so overwhelming
that those who were less keen on the
boycott action were often forced to comply
with the patriots' demands to avoid being
assaulted or slandered In public. I9)
Chinese merchants were especially fearful
of being accused of handling Japanese
goods. Rival Chinese companies some-
times engaged in sabotage operations by
accusing the others of dealing in Japanese
goods so that the latter would be harassed
and boycotted [5, 273/641/50055, Part 2;
19) Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs between
1937 and 1941 readily confirm the highly












See Singapore Chamber of Commerce Report for
the Year 1940 [28: 62].
20)
After the outbreak of the Second World
War in Europe In September 1939,
several defence regulations were enforced
In Malaya. One of them aimed at
controlling the flow of exchange to non-
sterling bloc countries through restriction
or prohibition of various imports. The
121 restricted imports and 236 prohibited
items included most of the major Japanese
exports to Malaya [27, LXXIV, notifica-
tion nos. 3123 and 3631]. The restrictions
were implemented with inadequate admin-
istrative facilities and caused some dis-
ruption in business transactions.20) The
Singapore Chamber of Commerce stated










Percentage of Merchandise Imported into Malaya
from Various Countries, 1935-1940
1) Malaya Return ofForeign Imports and Exports [25, 1935-
1937]
The Foreign Trade of Malaya for the Year 1938
Malayan Statistics, Dec. 1939-1940
Table 13
Sources:
Country 1935 1936 1937 1938
Japan 6.5 6.5 6.0 2.3
Australia 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.4
U.K. 16.1 15.2 15.6 18.7
China 4.4 4.4 4.1 4.4
Hong Kong 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6
Europe 4.8 4.8 5.8 6.5
U.S.A. 2.0 1.9 2.3 3.1
Siam 13.6 15.3 13.6 15.7
of the Lee Pineapple Com-
pany which had apparently
~T=o-t-a~I=V~a~~-e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~fuceddkect Japanese com-
of Malayan petition. Whether Tan Kah
Imports (in 466,650 503,024 579,913 546,610 620,619 824,107
Straits Dollars Kee, the acknowledged
OOO's)~~---"-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ leader of the movement,
still harboured resentments
against the Japanese cut-
throat competition that he
had had to fight in the early 1930s is
debatable. As such, no conclusive evidence
can be drawn to support the contention
of the economic motivation.
2)
3)
26, J ul. 1938].
In 1938, the exports to Riau was a
mere one-tenth of that exported during
the heyday of smuggling activities in 1936
(See Table 8.). In addition, it was
reported that the Singapore tailors, who
had gone to Riau, had all returned to
Singapore [18: 642]. Japanese goods
coming through intermediate ports were
also checked. That the total Japanese
textile imports in 1938 was only about 73
percent of its national quota allocation
bears testimony to the intensity of the
boycotts.
One may suspect that one of the moti-
vations for the boycotts was economic,
since Japanese competition between 1930
and 1936 adversely affected local produc-
ers and importers of non-Japanese goods.
Evidence suggests, however, that econom-
ics did not constitute any strong motiva-
tion. Few Chinese were manufacturers or
exclusively inlporters of west-
ern products which remained
==========================
the domain of the Euro-
pean merchant houses. One
exception was Lee Kong
Chian, a prominent leader
of the anti-Japanese move-
ment. Lee was the chairman
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insuperable obstacle to legitimate trade
with countries outside the sterling area
has been created" [28: 66] . The state-
ment is verified by the import statistics
which show no decline in 1939 and a
visible increase in 1940 both in total
imports and imports from Japan (See
Table 14.). One can safely conclude that
the import controls played a minor role in
checking Japanese competition before
1941.
In 1941, however, japan's share of the
mainly manufactured market dipped to
2.96 percent. In March 1941, the Singa-
pore Chamber of Commerce complained:
"Government controls have increased in
severity and in number and there is very
little left of the freedom and independence
on which the Straits merchants prided
himself." [29, Annual General Meeting,
28 Mar. 1940]. Apparently, it was be-
coming difficult to obtain import permits
in general, as the war in Europe inten-
sified. It may well have been even more
difficult to get permits for imports from
Japan, as it became a German ally in
September 1940. Following the pact,
there developed much greater unity of
action between the British and American
governments, and they adopted a stiffer
attitude towards japan. This throws
some light on Yoji Akashi's puzzlement
over the sudden and sharp decrease of
Japanese imports in 1941 [24: 145].
Other factors, notably the restrictions on
raw material imports into japan and
rising costs of production in japan, should
also be considered [30: 285]. In any
case, as indicated in Table 14, japanese
Table 14 Imports of Articles Wholly or Mainly
Manufactured Goods from Japan,
1935-1941 (in Straits Dollars OOO's)
Imports Total % ofYear Malayan Totalfrom Japan Imports Imports
1935 24,253,168 204,058,558 11.89
1936 25,812,452 203,350,598 12.69
1937 32,735,677 283,064,161 11.56
1938 9,127,258 246,506,712 3.70
1939 9,938,336 250,132,542 3.97
1940 13,259,288 294,827,457 4.50
1941* 6,249,365 210,957,682 2.96
Sources: 1) Malaya Return ofForeign Imports and
Exports [25, 1935-1937]
2) The Foreign Trade of Malaya for the
Year 1938
3) Malayan Statistics, Dec. 1939-1941
Note: * 1941 values are values for Jan. to Sept.
1941. The last publication before the
war was Malayan Statistics, Sept. 1941.
competitIOn had practically crumbled
after the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in July 1937.
VIII Conclusion
Japanese competition in prewar Malaya
blossomed and wilted within the short
space of a decade because of the changing
international environment In which
l\1alaya and japan found themselves. The
world depression in the late 1920s coupled
with japan's untimely deflationary policy
resulted in japanese industries being
thoroughly rationalized. This laid the
groundwork for Japanese trade rivalry in
the 1930s. The Malayan public found
the cheap Japanese goods especially at-
tractive during the frugal depression years
as the depreciating yen made japanese
imports cheaper. However, although cur-
rency depreciation and the world de-
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pression played critical roles in the sudden
burst of Japanese competition between
1932 and 1934, the underlying basis for
Japanese success was increased industrial
efficiency.
This was why Japanese competItIOn
did not subside after 1934 when the effects
of depreciation and depression had worn
off. The absence of these abnormally
propitious factors in the years 1935-1937,
however, made further dramatic increases
in market share impossible. Nevertheless,
even the moderated level of competition
was serious enough to elicit clamour for
restrictions as "the habit of economy in
spending inculcated during the recent
years of depression has not entirely
disappeared: for this reason high class
goods have a narrowing outlet in com-
parison with a widening demand for a
lower standard of quality." [4: 81. Hence,
Japan's price advantage was a decisive
one in the economic battle for Malayan
markets.
Malaya remained a fairly open market
despite the specific textile quotas imposed
in 1934. Predictably, the quotas only
dampened the inflow of Japanese textiles
and were quite ineffective in curbing
overall Japanese competition. Local mer-
chants were forced to compete with the
Japanese because the Straits government
was reluctant to impose further economic
sanctions against Japan. In October
1938, Governor Shenton Thomas stated
that the losses to Japanese competition
were in part due to inefficiencies in British
trading methods and, therefore, restrictive
legislation would not help much [22, Oct.
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1936, B65].
The Second Sino-Japanese War turned
the tide against Japanese competition as it
caused the Chinese middlemen to shun
Japanese imports. The Chinese consumer
also refused to buy Japanese products and,
thus, Japan's accessible Malayan market
was drastically reduced. Japanese com-
petition was curbed more by politically
motivated boycotts rather than by any
particular British action.
Japanese trade expansion during the
1930s raised protests among its rivals.
Those whose markets were affected ac-
cused Japan of unfair competition through
dumping or of deliberate depreciation of
the yen to promote exports. In retrospect,
these accusations seem groundless. In the
first place, the Japanese government did
not engage in extensive subsidization of
export industries and the latter certainly
did not operate at a loss. Admittedly, some
Japanese companies must have dumped
their goods abroad but this charge cannot
be extended to the Japanese economy as a
whole. An official report in Malaya
noted: "The sale of an article abroad at
less than its retail price in the country of
production is a common-place of modern
commercial competition, and is made
possible by a protective duty in that
country and not by any subsidy." [1, I,
14: 183]. Furthermore, although drastic
depreciation of the yen was triggered off by
Japan's departure from the gold standard,
the decision did not aim at devaluing the
currency in order to promote exports. The
cheap yen was an unintended result which
the prestige-conscious Japanese govern-
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ment was unhappy with but had little
means to alleviate.
Western over-reaction, however, was
understandable. Western industries pushed
out of their established markets when in
the deep of the depression, experienced
disconcerting and often painful re-adjust-
ments. The woeful conditions facing for-
merly prosperous industrial centres such
as Lancashire provoked heart-felt sym-
pathy and bitter resentment.
Nevertheless, at least theoretically,
Japan had every right to expand its
overseas markets. Moreover, in purely
economic terms, Japan's trade expansion
in l\lalaya appears to have been more than
justified, SInce geographical proximity
gave Japan an absolute advantage. Not
only did it produce economical lines that
were suited to the standard of living in
Malaya, but it was able to produce them
at a lower cost and ship them to Malaya
more cheaply. From an economic view-
point, Japanese competition was fully
acceptable, save for the isolated instances
of imitation or economic piracy. It seems
that much of the unhappiness was caused
by the tempo and concentrated nature of
Japan's export drive.2I) Its rival economies
hardly had any time to re-adjust and the
short run effect was a move towards
restriction. Had the japanese economic
thrust come at a slower pace, the protests
would certainly have been milder.
The basic assumption of the British was
21) See M.S. Farley, The Problem of Japanese
Trade Expansion in the Post-war Situation
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,
1939).
that they were entitled to retain a share of
the Malayan market which they had
maintained and defended at a high cost.
Unfortunately, the restriction of japanese
imports had negative corollaries in that the
artificially high priced goods adversely
affected the consumer. Restrictions were
sparingly applied since the effects on
consumer welfare were often unacceptable.
Administrators often suggested a move by
British business toward higher efficiency
through cooperation or reorganization of
trading methods rather than direct re-
striction on japanese goods. This does not
mean, however, that the British adminis-
trators did not share the assumption of the
British right to dominate the Malayan
market. japan's problem was that it had
become an industrialized country later
than its western counterparts and thus had
to encroach on established markets for
want of alternatives.
Actually, one wonders how far japanese
competition did eat into the established
market in Malaya during the world
depression. Using the concept of market
segmentation, we can divide the Malayan
market into distinct high and low priced
segments. This concept helps explain why
losses in the high priced segment would
still have been bad even without the cheap
Japanese imports. The poorer Malayan
consumer would probably have forgone
consumption of certain items if not given
the cheap Japanese option. The low priced
Japanese goods in many cases did not
directly compete with the more expensive
higher quality imports from the West.
Japan, therefore, created new markets
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which would otherwise have remained
unsatisfied. For example, fewer buildings
might have been erected without the cheap
Japanese cement, tiles and other building
material imports. The effects of the textile
quotas clearly show this contention. The
decrease in Japanese textiles imported was
not nearly made up by increased imports
fronl other sources. Between 1933 and
1935, gross imports from Japan fell by
61. 7 million yards but imports from the
British empire only rose by 11.5 nlillion
yards. Imports from other countries fell
by 7.6 million yards [16: 330].
The cheaper Japanese imports had a
depressive effect on the prices of the higher
quality items and in the long run it caused
Japan's rivals to gear their exports more to
local needs. This again benefited the
consumer. Unfortunately, the influx of
cheap Japanese goods, while welcomed by
the consumer, brought little comfort to the
manufacturer and importer whose market
share was declining.
In the final analysis, it can be said that
Japanese competition was successful
because it had managed to find the proper
balance between price and quality so that
products had more value for money and
were more attractive than rival items.
Although it was often argued by British
merchant houses that buying a low priced
and lower quality product was false
economy, ultimately it was the consumer
who decided. The secret of Japanese
success was their ability to produce a
desired product or service at competitive
prices through efficient management and
incorporation or even improvement of
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western technology. To be sure, when the
great depression hit the world, Japan had
an advantage of being a traditional
producer of cheap exports whose market
suddenly expanded.22) The dramatic fall
of the value of its currency made its
exports even more inexpensive. By the
mid-1930s, these benefits had worn off.
l\,1oreover, as Japan recovered from the
depression, its cost of production rose
slowly. Its competitive edge was blunted,
but Japanese competition did not diminish
much.
I t was the combined effect of the textile
quotas, the anti-Japanese boycotts and the
exchange control regulations that sup-
pressed Japanese imports. Although they
were unrelated, each of them was at least
in part politically motivated. The quotas
were to retain Britain's share in the
colonial markets; the boycotts aimed at
econonuc retaliation against Japanese
military action in China; and exchange
controls were tightened against Japan, an
ally of Germany. The decline of Japanese
competItIon was therefore intimately
linked with political factors which tran-
scended economic rationality. Economics
cannot fully explain the dynamics of world
trade because political and social elements
often nullify absolute economic advan-
tages.
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